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JAMES H. CHEEK, III1 
  
 I would like to start by saying that I have picked up so many little pieces of 
experience along the way, and that it has been a very interesting journey.  One of the 
things that I would like to share with you today is a perspective based on over thirty 
years of working with both corporate boards and those who have tried to model 
corporate governance practices, ranging from the New York Stock Exchange and the 
Model Business Corporation Act to, more recently, Congressional legislation.   
 
 Hopefully, during this presentation I will give you some perspective about 
factors that have influenced both where we are today with what I would call a mail-
storm frenzy about corporate governance and what I perceive to be the right 
balance, through a check-and-balance system, for corporate America.  Having the 
right balance will give investors a sense of confidence and the marketplace a sense of 
                         
1 Mr. Cheek is a senior member of the law firm of Bass, Berry and Sims PLC in Nashville, Tennessee. 
He is a graduate of Duke University and Vanderbilt Law School, and has an LL.M. degree from 
Harvard University.  Mr. Cheek is an adjunct professor at Vanderbilt Law School and he is a member 
of the Faculty of Law at Jesus College in Cambridge University in England.  Mr. Cheek presented a 
lecture sponsored by The Center for Corporate Governance and The Clayton Center for 
Entrepreneurial Law on November 5, 2003, at the University of Tennessee College of Law.   
Mr. Cheek served as Chair of the ABA’s section on Business Law from 1998 to 1999, and is 
currently serving as the Chair of the National Task Force on Corporate Responsibility.  He is a 
member of the Legal Advisory Committee to the New York Stock Exchange, having served as its 
Chair from 1989 to 1992.  He also served as Chair of the Legal Advisory Board of the National 
Association of Security Dealers from 1995 to 1997.  He chaired the Federal Regulatory and Securities 
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sponsored by the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, ALI-ABA, PLI, and others.  In his practice, 
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responsibility that senior management and boards will apply their fiduciary duties.   
 
Overview 
 
 It is hard to believe that a little over two years ago the corporate governance 
scene was quite calm.  In a relatively short period of time, a dramatic set of events 
has profoundly intensified the view of good corporate governance.  We are only two 
years past Enron.  Enron was the leading edge of a number of financial frauds that 
caused a crisis in overall confidence, resulting in legislative and regulatory reactions.  
These reactions have impacted what corporate governance is today.  We are only one 
year past the anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:2 federal legislation reflecting 
that Congress, for the first time since the thirties, determined to weigh in on how 
corporations are to be structured and governed.  Sarbanes-Oxley marked a major 
shift of historic direction of regulatory influence. 
 
 It is difficult to pick up a newspaper without seeing a whole section on 
corporate governance and how to be a good director.  There are more institutes and 
programs going on every week than you can hope to count on twenty hands; it is the 
issue of the day.  While it is important to recognize the “trees” of that issue, it is also 
important to recognize the “forest” that surrounds those issues, which is what I am 
going to try to relate today. 
 
Counseling Corporate Directors 
 
 In your role as a corporate director or as a counselor advising corporate 
directors, there are two things which I would suggest to you are fundamental parts of 
any good corporate governance scheme.  First, the legal fiduciary duties of directors 
have not changed.  Those duties have been around for a long time.  While we have a 
subset of specific responsibilities that new legislation, new listing standards, and new 
judicial decisions have imposed on those directors, the over-arching fiduciary duty is 
the same: to be awake and to pay attention to what is going on.  The second 
fundamental duty requires that a director not only pay attention, but that he or she 
becomes fully-informed.  This second prong is what I see missing in a lot of 
boardrooms, and what historically continues to be refined in the new system of 
corporate governance.   
 
                         
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at 403 (2000) (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 19 U.S.C.). 
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 Being fully informed means that you know what decisions you are being 
asked to make, and that you know what responsibilities you have with respect to 
those decisions.  It is not just showing up, having a book presented to you in the 
middle of a board meeting, and making a decision based on a ten-minute 
presentation by a senior manager on a major issue.  You must pay attention, be 
informed, and apply that informed judgment with a dose of healthy skepticism about 
what you are hearing from management, particularly if there is a personal interest or 
conflict associated with the matter that is presented to you. 
 
Independence 
 
 That principle goes to the next paradigm of how a director is supposed to 
act.  A director is supposed to act in the best interest of the shareholders without 
conflict of personal interest.  That is where we get into the notion that is the focus of 
the press and all the regulators: the rubric of independence.  We will talk a little bit 
about how that notion is being shaped.  Apart from the legal and judicial definition, 
this notion reflects coming to an issue with an independent mind and a focus on 
what is going to be in the best interest of the shareholder on the basis of an 
informed judgment.  As I previously stated, that is the first principle and it has not 
changed.  It has been the standard for a long time.  
 
Corporate Culture 
 
 The second standard of board responsibility is to understand the culture of 
the business that board members are directing.  I cannot emphasize this enough.  In 
most financial frauds, the business culture stinks, and it mostly stinks from the top 
down.  You can see this in situations like Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, and HealthSouth, 
for example.  A driven CEO or entrepreneur, even with the most tremendous 
business plan in the world and a great instinct for leadership, can drive an 
organization to bad things if that individual creates a culture of not doing the right 
thing.  A board has the responsibility to understand the culture and to influence that 
culture in a way that assures accountability and responsibility in the organization.   
  
Influences on Corporate Governance 
 
 Some factors have clearly driven the new regime of corporate governance.  
The most obvious ones, the most media-focused ones, the ones that make all of the 
wonderful sound bites that we hear, are the set of financial fraud scandals that 
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started with Enron and Arthur Anderson.  At that point in time, this was a complex 
accounting fraud that had a lot of different parts as it unraveled.  But at the time of 
Enron, many debated about whether Enron’s accounting techniques really had been 
within the letter of accounting literature.   
   
 Enron had the absolute perfect governing system imbedded in its board at 
that time.  The majority of Enron’s board was thought to be independent, it had all 
the right committees, it had all the right governance principles, and it also had codes 
of ethics.  However, at the top, it had really greedy, dominant people who created a 
system of earnings management that was very sophisticated and complex.  After the 
start of the Enron scandal, there was no hewing cry.  There was concern and a little 
bit of pause, then came the bill by Senator Sarbanes.3  In the Senate, the bill had no 
legs and did not go anywhere; we did not have massive change.  If the Enron scandal 
was the only one of its kind, I do not think we would have had the massive change in 
corporate governance that we see today.  
 
 But Enron was not isolated.  We saw failure after failure with Tyco, 
WorldCom, Adelphia, and so forth.  Together, these scenarios created a political 
issue in Congress and in the White House that demanded quick resolution.  Fall 
elections were looming and Congress wanted to have a response to the public about 
what Congress was doing about these massive financial frauds that had been 
uncovered.  At that point, there was the most frenzied legislative reaction that I have 
seen in the history of Congressional action on corporate matters.   
 
 Typically, you have a process, where lobbyists and drafting experts weigh in 
and a lot of legislative history is built in.  However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act went 
very quickly through Congress; there is very little legislative history and there was no 
careful drafting of that bill.  The language throughout the Act is difficult to 
understand, yet it was passed.  Just before its passage, a hundred and twelve 
amendments were added with very little language in support of what they were 
intended to do. 
 
 The Act was the product of political fallout resulting in a frenzied 
governmental and Congressional reaction.  Paul O’Neill,4 the Treasury Secretary, said 
that we ought to hang all the scoundrels from the highest trees to insure proper 
                         
3 U.S. Senator Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland. 
 
4 Paul H. O’Neil served as Treasury Secretary from January 2001 until December 2002. 
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corporate governance.  All of this rhetoric took place at a time when there was no 
stopping the momentum of change.  Therefore, these first and perhaps most 
dramatic set of events set us off on the course of where we are currently. 
 
 As these facts unveiled, there resulted a series of outrageous instances of 
senior executives, who had the fiduciary trust as an officer of a corporation, wrestling 
away all kinds of personal benefits from the coffers of the corporation.  Kozlowski,5 
who is on trial in connection with all the excessive amounts of payments that were 
made to him and personal expenses that he off-loaded on the corporation, is the 
most visible one now.  
 
 Although curious, Dick Grasso6 has had more influence on regulations than 
Kozlowski or other officers.  People were outraged and offended by Grasso’s 
compensation package of $139.5 million to run the New York Stock Exchange.  
Grasso’s influence is curious because the New York Stock Exchange is not public: 
Grasso did not steal from the shareholders or even from the members that own the 
New York Stock Exchange.  Grasso fully negotiated his compensation package, 
which was reviewed and approved because he was doing a great job, a very unusual 
set of circumstances. The New York Stock Exchange has two components: a 
regulatory side and a market side.  The members of the Exchange are associated with 
the market side and they set Grasso’s compensation.  Yet, Grasso still had regulatory 
policing responsibilities over the members which, coupled with the size of his 
compensation package, created ripple implications throughout the compensation 
world in corporate governance.  The board then went public saying that they did not 
know what Grasso was making and did not understand his contract.  These were 
horrific statements for any board person to make, but it was their public spin on how 
to avoid the feeding frenzy approaching them. 
 
 Compensation committees are now more focused on the size of 
compensation packages and on their own lack of knowledge about such packages.  
They do not just rubber-stamp every complex deferred compensation plan that 
comes to them anymore.  These committees are getting outside consultants to come 
in to advise them as to what each plan says; this is a governance change.  
Compensation packages are now under much higher scrutiny, which is due in large 
part to Grasso.   
                         
5 L. Dennis Kozlowski was formerly CEO of Tyco International Ltd. 
 
6 Dick Grasso is the former chairman of the New York Stock Exchange. 
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Shareholder Influence on Governance 
 
 Another factor to consider is that the public and regulatory outcry has 
resulted in increased pressure and activism of institutional holders.  Now, it is not 
just public retirement plans like CalPERS7 that are active.  Other funds, like Fidelity 
and Vanguard, are beginning to exercise some shareholder muscle in order to affect 
good governance practices.   
 
 This last year’s proxy season saw the largest number of shareholder proposals 
ever, and the largest number of shareholder proposals that were approved by a 
majority vote.  Traditionally, you have a very low percentage of those that ever get 
approved.  Now, a whole host of new weapons for aggressive institutional 
shareholders are being imbedded in the governance system, and these with mutual 
fund voting policies.  
 
 One of the reasons Fidelity and Vanguard are getting in this game is that the 
SEC now mandates that every mutual fund publicly disclose how it will vote on 
certain issues.  Therefore, this puts pressure on the mutual funds to adopt a “white 
hat” shareholder-protective stance in their voting policies on issues like poison-pilled 
plans and stock option plans.  This new additional pressure is now a part of the 
system. 
 
 The SEC published, for public comment, a new proposal that permits 
shareholders, if they leap a few hurdles, to include competing nominees for board 
positions in company proxy material.  Historically, the only way a group like Fidelity 
or CalPERS could change a board composition was to launch a proxy fight, which 
meant they had to go to the expense of doing proxy solicitation.  Now, under this 
proposed new rule, companies will be able to submit competing nominees in their 
company materials.  This practice is going to change the dynamics of corporate 
governance.   
 
 Lastly, institutional shareholders are more willing to litigate governance issues 
than in times past.  One of my clients is HCA, a major hospital company in 
Nashville.  The New York State Teacher’s Retirement Fund brought a derivative 
action against HCA regarding some fraudulent activities that occurred in that 
                         
7 CalPERS, or the California Public Employees Retirement System, is the largest public pension fund 
in the United States. 
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company many years ago. That action settled when HCA accepted the wholesale 
adoption of new and sweeping corporate governance guidelines.  So, litigation is 
another tool that aggressive shareholders can and do use to impact corporate 
governance. 
 
Battling Regulators 
 
 Now, we have the battling regulators.  New York Attorney General Elliott 
Spitzer embarrassed the Securities and Exchange Commission on a level not often 
seen.  Through a network of tips, Spitzer aggressively pursued and unveiled frauds, 
mostly in the mutual fund arena, that the SEC had chosen to ignore.  Now, 
governmental agencies face internal pressures to outdo each other by enhancing their 
appearance as being tough, forceful regulators.  This will impact how enforcement 
actions are settled and how regulations are developed in the future.  As an aside, it is 
interesting to note that a number of U.S. Attorneys have been taking on a tougher 
enforcement attitude in the criminal arena in order to build up their public image. 
 
Business Opportunities Under the New Regime 
 
 From an entirely different perspective, the new regime of governance has 
created many productive business opportunities for lawyers.  I have advised an 
increasing number of boards on governance practices over the last two years.  The 
new regime of governance has also created many continuing legal education 
programs (“CLEs”) for the profit-oriented CLE provider. The New York Stock 
Exchange’s new standards mandate corporate director education programs, and 
many CLE providers are offering such programs.   
 
 In addition, the industry has experienced an upsurge in shareholder rating 
services.  ISS8 is both the leading advisor on how institutional shareholders should 
vote their shares and the leading provider of shareholder rating services.  For a fee, 
ISS will review a public company’s governance practices and give it a score.  These 
scores have taken on a life of their own.  Institutional holders tend to invest more in 
higher-rated scores believing that good corporate governance leads to good 
corporate performance.  This is not always the case, but these services have 
proliferated to the extent that they are now a major factor in how boards and 
companies structure themselves in order to obtain and maintain a good score.  
                         
8 Institutional Shareholder Services; information available at http://www.issproxy.com.   
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Therefore, shareholder rating services are another factor to consider in this 
discussion. 
 
Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
 As previously mentioned, Sarbanes-Oxley was legislation passed about a year 
ago which created a significant number of changes in the corporate governance 
regime.  The American Society of Corporate Secretaries recently conducted a survey 
on public companies that reflected the range of changes and practices that Sarbanes-
Oxley has dictated.  
 
 With all of these new responsibilities and new processes, people have been 
slow to recognize the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”).  The PCAOB is a new and independent regulatory board; it is not a 
branch of the SEC.  The PCAOB has its own general counsel, its own staff, its own 
investigative authority, and its own cost structure.  The PCAOB was designed to 
create a public oversight organization to deal with auditor independence. 
 
 Like every other regulatory body, the PCAOB is moving toward empire 
status and will impose enormous costs on public company life.  One obvious cost is 
that of running the agency, a cost paid for by public companies.  More importantly is 
the hard cost that PCAOB’s regulatory rules, which are designed to improve and 
enhance auditing processing and internal control, will impose on public companies. 
 
Costs of Compliance 
 
  Some have estimated the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley at over ten 
million dollars.  Others have placed the number between one and five million dollars. 
 Most surveys have showed that compliance costs have at least doubled since 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  These costs include director and officer’s liability insurance costs, 
accounting and legal costs, public relations costs, board compensation costs, and 
other personnel and investor costs.  All of these things are added as hard-dollar 
costs.   
 
 In addition to these hard-dollar costs, there are other costs to consider.  
Some in the industry comment that “the reformers have decided that the solution is 
to drive a wedge between the CEO and the board, with separate meetings set up, to 
make sure they don’t all get too cozy with each other.”  That aspect of driving the 
wedge is what I call the relationship cost imbedded in Sarbanes-Oxley.   
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 Sarbanes-Oxley contains individual certification requirements designed to 
have the CEO and CFO certify the correctness of the financial and text information 
in certain ballots filed with the SEC.9  This has proliferated into separate disclosure 
and internal control committees that give certifications up to the CEOs and CFOs.  
As a result, committee members, as well as advisors to public companies, have to go 
on the line in a way that they have never had to in the past, causing more tension. 
 
 For the first time, the lawyers are subject to reporting obligations imposed by 
the SEC, in effect federalizing professional conduct standards of lawyers 
representing public companies.  This creates a tension in the attorney-client 
relationship.  This tension is also apparent in the accountant-management 
relationship.  The comptroller committee of the board, not the management, hires 
and compensates the accountants.10  The audit committee has oversight 
responsibility over the accountants.  Therefore, auditors, under PCAOB’s standards, 
have to give a report card to the audit committee about how well the audit 
committee is performing.11  So Sarbanes-Oxley incorporates these well-intentioned 
checks and balances that I see possibly creating relationship tensions that did not 
exist before. 
 
 In addition to the federal legislation, which included a number of regulatory 
and SEC rule-making authority provisions, we have major markets such as the New 
York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.12  The SEC finalized the proposed rules 
that the NYSE and NASDAQ submitted, which were the result of a long negotiating 
process between the two markets and the SEC to try to build a common platform of 
standards.  The NYSE tried to put itself at a higher level than the NASDAQ.  The 
NASDAQ believed that it needed more flexibility due to the wider range of company 
sizes listed on its market. 
 
 In the end, the two markets were sort of pushed together.  They are not 
identical, but they generally have the same tone: a majority of independent directors; 
                         
9 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 
10 Id. at §301(m)(2). 
 
11 See id. at §204.  
 
12 National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (System). 
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specific independence criteria; a board that makes affirmative determinations of 
independence; regular executive sessions of non-management directors; committee 
structures made up entirely of independent directors; written charters; and specific 
responsibilities and report card obligations requiring the committees to evaluate how 
well they have done and how effectively they have performed their duties. 
 
 Publicly available corporate governance guidelines must be on a website or 
otherwise be publicly available.13  Additionally, codes of business-conducting ethics 
must be adopted and made publicly available.14  As I have previously mentioned, the 
CEO has to go on the line each year and certify to the SEC that all of these things 
have been done.  The NASDAQ is very similar, but it has a little more built-in 
flexibility.  One feature which the NASDAQ possesses that the NYSE does not is 
the requirement of specific audit-committee approval of related party transactions.  
This feature provides a check-and-balance with respect to potential conflicts that 
exist in related party transactions. 
 
Judiciary Influence on Governance 
 
 Other factors having a significant impact on the way that boards structure 
their governance practices are the occurrences in judicial decisions in what I call 
special investigation reports.  This year there has been a trio of Delaware cases that 
have focused on governance issues and on the issue of when a director might be 
deemed to be independent for the purpose of determining, in the course of a special 
litigation committee, whether a derivative litigation should be dismissed.  The Oracle15 
and HealthSouth16 cases relate to those two issues. 
 
 In Oracle, the Delaware Vice-Chancellor17 found that the special litigation 
committee could not be independent because of the close relationships between the 
company, its directors, Stanford University, and Oracle, the target of the derivative 
                         
13 See generally id. at §103. 
 
14 Id. at §101(g)(3). 
 
15 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 
16 In re HealthSouth Corp. S’holders Litig., 2003 WL 2276905 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2003). 
 
17 The Honorable Leo B. Strine, Jr., Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
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litigation.18   
 
Oracle and Larry Ellison19 had made charitable contributions to Stanford 
University, where two of the three special litigation committee members were 
professors or administrative officials.20  The Vice-Chancellor found a truly 
independent review to be unlikely due to the impact of the charitable contributions.21 
 Two years ago, most people would have seen this as an arguable case of a disabling 
relationship. 
 
 HealthSouth is another case involving a special litigation committee.  An 
outside law firm conducted a special investigation of Mr. Scrushy22 for insider 
trading.  The initial investigation cleared Scrushy of any wrongdoing.  The chair of 
the special litigation committee issued a press release, saying that he was delighted 
that Mr. Scrushy had been cleared of any wrongdoing, and that the company was 
moving forward with Mr. Scrushy as CEO.  The Vice-Chancellor found the 
statement of the chairman of the special litigation committee to be inappropriate.  
He also found the review of Mr. Scrunchy was not adequately independent.  The 
Vice-Chancellor later found Scrushy guilty of unjust enrichment and equitable 
fraud.23 
 
 Walt Disney24 was the first of the trio of cases to be decided.  This case 
involved a very lucrative compensation arrangement that had been put into place for 
a friend of the CEO.  The Chancellor25 found that the board of directors breached 
                         
18 See supra note 15.  
 
19 Lawrence “Larry” Ellison was a member of Oracle’s board of directors. 
 
20 See supra note 15. 
 
21 In re Oracle, 824 A.2d at 948. 
 
22 Richard M. Scrushy was HealthSouth’s former Chairman and CEO. 
 
23 See supra note 16. 
 
24 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 
25 The Honorable William B. Chandler, III, Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.  
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the duty of good faith with the compensation arrangement.26  This was the first 
Delaware case, at least in recent memory, to find that a board breached a duty of 
good faith.  This decision is important because it sets a precedent for stripping away 
the protections that the Delaware statute provides against monetary damages 
resulting from the negligent conduct of a board director.  Basically, if the director 
does not act in good faith, she will not be protected by the Delaware statute.  So, 
there is enormous potential for ramifications. 
 
 The Chancellor Group27 case was the first SEC enforcement action against an 
outside director solely on the basis of the director’s failure to respond to the red flags 
raised around the soundness of the corporate entity’s accounting methods.  The 
director had no direct involvement in the fraud, nor did he profit a single dollar 
through the fraud; he was merely the chairman of the audit committee.  The SEC 
imposed sanctions and significant money penalties on the director.  This reflects the 
shifting tide of holding directors more personally accountable. 
 
Other Considerations 
 
 Richard Breeden28 proposed a very radical set of governance proposals that 
are getting some legs in the media and in actual practice.  One of his proposals 
requires that there be at least one new director each year.  Another proposal requires 
that there be at least eight board meetings per year.  Breeden also proposed that 
there be caps on executive comptrollers set by the board. 
 
 These types of proposals are what I like to call “creeping legs.”  They are put 
out there by a credible source as a result of massive fraud and people begin to 
consider them as they shape their corporate governance principles.  Even though 
they have no statutory or legislative basis and are not being mandated by 
shareholders, people begin to weave them into their structures.  Ultimately, they 
become a part of the fabric of what we are discussing.   
 
All of this has had an impact upon directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.  
                         
26 See supra note 24. 
 
27 SEC v. Chancellor Group, Inc., 1998 SEC LEXIS 2729 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 
28 Richard Breeden, Corporate Monitor of WorldCom.  Mr. Breeden served as Chairman of the SEC 
from 1989 to 1993.  Mr. Breeden also served as a senior financial and domestic policy advisor to 
President George H.W. Bush during his tenure as Vice President and President.  
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The market has gotten much more expensive, and now insurance policies have many 
more exclusions built into them.  One must be very careful, if involved with a public 
company, in making sure that the policy is as solid as it seems. 
 
Being a Lawyer for a Corporate Client 
 
 One more topic needs to be addressed in this discussion.  The whole role of 
being a lawyer for a corporate client is shifting in terms of the depth of 
responsibilities that the lawyer possesses.  §307 of Sarbanes-Oxley,29 a late 
amendment by Senator Edwards,30 initially drove the change.  The amendment came 
only one day before the legislation was enacted.  §307 states: 
 
Not later than 180 days after July 30, 2002, the Commission shall 
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for 
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way 
in the representation of issuers, including a rule: 
 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of 
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by 
the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or 
the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent 
thereof); and 
 
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the 
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures 
or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney 
to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of 
directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of 
directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or 
indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.31 
 
                         
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at §307. 
 
30 Senator John Edwards of North Carolina. 
 
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at §§307(1) & (2). 
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So, with that authority, the SEC put forth a set of rules in §205,32 which is very broad 
in its applicability and reach, and is designed for attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the Commission.  This includes not only securities lawyers, but also anybody 
who touches a public filing that a corporate entity files with the SEC, as well as 
anybody who has a communication with the SEC.  So, it also includes litigators, tax 
lawyers, and real estate lawyers.  It has a very broad reach, and firms throughout the 
country are setting up coordinating procedures; it is an individual lawyer’s 
responsibility, but firms are setting up procedures to help lawyers meet that 
responsibility. 
 
 Sarbanes-Oxley builds upon the concept of a chief legal officer, where a 
person within the corporate entity is designated to receive concerns from in-house or 
outside lawyers; either type might have a concern about a breach of fiduciary duty or 
a material violation of the law.  Their responsibility is to report those concerns to the 
CLO and in turn, the CLO has to take appropriate action and then report back to 
the reporting attorney on what the CLO has done.  If the CLO fails to do that, or if 
the reporting attorney does not believe that the CLOs reaction is appropriate, then 
the reporting attorney has to go all the way up to the board of directors with the 
information. 
 
 There is an alternative concept integrated in this process: a corporate 
governance concept that says rather than going to the CLO, a corporation can 
decide, in the boardroom, to have a qualified legal compliance committee, such as a 
corporate governance committee.  Qualified legal compliance committees are 
designed to receive the concerns of reporting attorneys. 
 
Reporting Out Obligations 
 
I have put, as a final bullet, “reporting up and out obligations.”  I have 
already discussed the reporting up obligations, which means reporting up, within the 
corporate client, to the board of directors.  One proposed rule, which has the 
possibility of becoming final, is if the board fails to take appropriate action, then the 
lawyer must report the legal concern out to the SEC.  Of course, this rule has 
tremendous implications for the profession in terms of the duty of confidentiality 
between the lawyer and the client.  When you are mandated to report out a concern, 
the board is not pleased, and the ability of the lawyer and client to have a free and 
informed discussion about issues is impeded. 
                         
32 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at §205. 
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 The ABA created a task force on corporate responsibility that deals with the 
issues of the proposed rule and tries to keep the Commission within its legislative 
mandate of only doing a reporting up rule and not going to a reporting out model.  
The task force published a report which can be obtained on the “Business Law 
Section” of the ABA website.33   
 
 In August 2003, the House of Delegates of the ABA adopted three principle 
recommendations as ABA policy.  The first, and perhaps the most important of the 
three, is a set of governance principles designed to assure that lawyers are kept in the 
loop and have the opportunity to be part of a checks and balances system within a 
corporate entity to assure corporate accountability and responsibility.  Some of the 
principles include the concept that lawyers be able to meet in an executive session 
with a committee of independent directors and communicate freely, without fear of 
retribution, about the concerns that the lawyer has about the system of corporate 
governance.   
 
Ethics Rule Changes 
 
 The ethics rule changes are two-fold.  One change concerns Rule 1.13, which 
relates to the corporate entity as the client.  This change leaves a lot of professional 
judgment to the lawyer about material violations of law that have a substantial 
financial impact on the client.   
 
 The more controversial of these rules is Ethics Rule 1.6 which deals with the 
duty of confidentiality.  This was a hotly contested proposal in the ABA House of 
Delegates.  At the end of the day, it passed, 218 to 201, a fairly thin margin.  The rule 
changed the duty of confidentiality which permits, but does not mandate, a lawyer to 
take action that would prohibit a client from using the lawyer’s services to commit a 
crime or fraud that clearly would result in substantial financial harm to third parties.  
Though this idea has never been a part of the ABA model rules, it is a part of 
professional rules of practice in forty-two states. 
 
                         
33 American Bar Association, Business Law Section, at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/home.html. 
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 The things discussed above are specifically unique to lawyers, as the lawyer 
participates in this system of corporate governance.  And with that, Dr. Neel,34 I will 
take any questions.   
 
 DR. NEEL:  Do you think that we have moved too far in Sarbanes-Oxley, 
and if we have moved so far as to make it such an onerous activity now to comply, 
have we precluded some firms that would normally be thinking about seeking public 
capital to either delay or abandon that decision simply because of the inability or the 
expense of compliance? 
 
 MR. CHEEK:  USA Today published an article called, “Sarbanes-Oxley:  
Dragon or White Knight.”35  In that article, the sub-headline is, “Law may be 
beneficial, but CEOs complain that red tape wastes time, brain, and resources.”36  
And one of the quotes in here is, “As a general rule of thumb, any bill that passes the 
United States Senate 97-0 is probably a horrible idea.”37 
 
 One of the things the article focused on was the cost impact that I have 
talked about, and the cost of compliance is very difficult for small cap companies to 
deal with.  This whole regimen of disclosure controls and internal controls is more 
easily absorbed by a larger business than a smaller business.  One of the suggestions 
in the article was that the cost of compliance and the cost of interference of 
relationship issues would drive companies from not going public, and encourage 
companies that were public to go private.38   
 
 The facts do not support that contention.  Going public is far more driven 
by market conditions than cost of compliance issues.  There is a resurgence of initial 
public offerings now, including small cap companies, which would be subject to this 
                         
34 C. Warren Neel, Director of the Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Tennessee. 
From 1977 to 2000, Dr. Neel served as Dean of the College of Business Administration at The 
University of Tennessee in Knoxville.  Dr. Neel is also a director of Saks, Inc., and a former director 
of Clayton Homes, Inc.  He served as the Commissioner of Finance for the State of Tennessee from 
June 2000 until January 2003.   
 
35 Del Jones, Sarbanes-Oxley: Dragon or White Knight?, USA Today, Oct. 20, 2003, at 1B. 
 
36 Id. 
 
37 Id. 
 
38 Id. 
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compliance.  Indeed, what is interesting is that a company has to be in compliance 
with Sarbanes-Oxley before filing a registration statement.  So, a company must set 
up all these systems before it knows whether it will be successful in doing a public 
offering.   
 
 The frustration of how to take a company private is clear for many people. 
So, it may be too early to really answer that, but I really do not think there is going to 
be a lot of grumbling and a lot of impact on people.  However, I also do not think 
the result will be a diminution of public companies. 
 
 GUEST:  Do you think that the results of the Delaware cases on publicly-
traded companies will have any impact on Tennessee statutes regarding the liability 
of directors on non-public companies? 
 
 MR. CHEEK:  That is an interesting question because our task force went 
around the country and conducted public hearings on the West and East Coasts and 
in the Midwest.  Because our governance principles applied to non-public as well as 
public institutions, we heard from a lot of people, both public advocates as well as 
people institutions like labor unions.  I think the Delaware cases will have an impact 
on the way non-public corporate entities are being governed where there are other 
constituencies.   
 
 I am seeing more and more cases that deal with issues of governance relating 
to labor unions and major charitable organizations that seem to have gone awry.  
There have been several United Way cases in the last several years.  So, I think all 
this will slowly ripple over.  I do not think the effects will necessarily be statutory, 
but more likely emerge through societal pressure and judicial decision-making.   
 
 MR. KUNEY39:  I want to follow up with one from a legal standpoint.  As 
far as large law firms that represent the public companies, is there talk about liability 
for the firms themselves? 
 
 MR. CHEEK:  Yes.  The insurance carriers are having a lot of discussion 
with their insureds about setting up a procedure by which there can be a consistent 
application of approach to very sensitive issues.  When one lawyer goes one direction 
                         
39 George W. Kuney, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Clayton Center for 
Entrepreneurial Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law.   
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and another lawyer goes another direction, there is a quality control issue and a 
liability issue because it creates that differential that plaintiffs lawyers can explore so 
well.  So, the Attorneys Liability Assurance Association, which insures most lawyers, 
strongly recommends at least a four-person §307 compliance committee, with a 
maximum of one corporate or securities lawyer.  The other members are a litigator, a 
risk management person, the person that is in charge of the insurance, and a 
management personnel that has overall supervisory responsibility within the firm.  
This way, firms have a multi-set of experiences that are brought to those issues.  It is 
too early yet to know how well this system will work.  I think there is going to be one 
bad poster child case; everyone just hopes that the poster child is not them.   
 
 DR. NEEL:  When Mr. Reed40 announced the first eight of what may 
become twelve board members, it would seem that he is addressing the governance 
issue, not the regulatory issue.  And while being a fine line, just a casual glance at the 
appointees, at least two or three are probably independent and the remainder, in all 
likelihood, will have some conflict if they met the same standards of the New York 
Stock Exchange list of companies.  What do you see is going to be the challenge of 
Mr. Reed with regard to maintaining the New York Stock Exchange regulatory role? 
 
 MR. CHEEK:  I think he is going to lose the battle.  I think Mr. Reed has 
been convinced by the staff at the New York Stock Exchange that that model does 
work as well for the New York Stock Exchange as it does for the NASDAQ, 
because of the specialty system on the floor and the way that market has historically 
been regulated.   
 
 The facts are that the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange has 
clearly been softer than the regulatory arm in the post NASDAQ settlement era in 
the NASDAQ.  Bill Donelson, Chairman of the Commission, is being convinced by 
his staff that that model is what needs to happen.  Therefore, I think Mr. Reed is 
dancing a political tightrope there from which he will fall because he cannot sustain it 
in today’s public world.  But, we will see.  There is no regulatory authority, other 
than the ongoing relationship authority, that they have to impose it on them. 
 
 DR. NEEL:  Thank you for speaking with us today. 
 
 MR. CHEEK:  Thank you very much. 
                         
40 John S. Reed.  On April 1, 2004, the New York Stock Exchange Board of Directors appointed 
Mr. Reed Chairman of the NYSE until its 2005 annual meeting.   
